Leadership in Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War.
(D. B. Levine. April 5, 2021)
This lecture is in three parts. I) A summary of Greek leaders whom Thucydides considers good, and those who are not so good; II) Thucydides’ admiration for Perikles and Brasidas; III) A discussion of the unique challenges of being a leader in the fickle Athenian democratic state.
- Who is Good and Who is Not Such a Good Leader?
Good: Thucydides seems to imply that Perikles and Nikias were good leaders because they were intrinsically more fond of excellence (arêtê) than their own agendas. They cared about their fellow citizens and the soldiers under their command. He seems to portray the Spartan general Brasidas in the same positive light.
Not So Good: Thucydides thinks less well of Alcibiades, whose narcissism and way of life meant that he did not care about others as much as he cared about himself. He talked his way into leading the Sicilian Expedition, but since the Athenians were so fickle, they immediately turned on him when he was under suspicion for the defacing of the Herms. This caused Alcibiades to go to the Spartan side and give them advice on how to beat the Athenians in the war. By his speech in favor of the Sicilian Expedition, Thucydides contrasts him with the more level-headed Nikias.
Thucydides believes that Alcibiades was one of the self-interested leaders that came to the fore after the death of Perikles: “Alciabdes believed that this would enable him to conquer both Sicily and Carthage, and that by succeeding he would at the same time add to his personal wealth as well as prestige” (6.15).
Not So Good: Thucydides ranks Kleon with the inferior Athenian leaders after Perikles. He was “in general the most violent of the citizens,” (3.36) and a braggart who won at Pylos by luck and the work of others, and whose death Thucydides characterizes as cowardly. He argued vehemently for the unjust punishment of all the men of Mytilene, and Thucydides contrasts him with the Diodotus, whose speech was full of good advice, that the Athenians finally accept, thus saving the male population of Mytilene, except for the ones who fomented the revolt. Thucydides said that the more reasonable Athenians wished to be rid of him (4.28).
Not So Good: In the Pentakontaetias in book 1, Thucydides tells the stories of Persian War heroes Themistocles the Athenian and Pausanias the Spartan. These leaders showed exceptional generalship respectively in the battles of Salamis and Plataia, which destroyed the Persian navies and armies, and assured that Greece would not become a Persian satrapy. But both of them were victims of greed; they were susceptible to bribery, and tried to increase their wealth and prestige by going over to the Persians.
II. THE BEST ATHENIAN LEADER AND THE BEST SPARTAN LEADER.
Here is what Thucydides admires about the Athenians Perikles and the Spartan Brasidas. Basically, they were uncorrupted by money or striving for personal advantage. They were mission-driven, level-headed, smart, and more dedicated and loyal to their cities than they were interested in personal gain. [Nikias, who is also a leader that Thucydides admired, will be discussed at the end.]
A. Perikles. Controlling the People’s Passions.
Among those speaking in favor of going to war with the Lacedaemonians was “Perikles son of Xanthippos, the first man in Athens at that time, the ablest in both speaking and acting…” (1.139: πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος).
Thucydides points out how Perikles says he will give his property to the Athenians if his guest-friend, the Spartan king Archidamos, spares it when his men ravage Attica (2.13).
Perikles shows his wisdom by not calling the Athenians to assembly when they were “in a passionate (ὀργή), rather than reasonable state (γνώμη)” (2.22).
In introducing the funeral oration at Athens after the first year of the war, Thucydides speaks of the practice to explain the Athenian custom, and introduces Pericles’ eulogy by saying “After they cover the dead with earth, a man chosen by the state, known for wise judgment (γνώμη) and of high reputation (δόξα), makes an appropriate speech of praise…” (2.34)
Thucydides summarizes his admiration for Pericles thus, stressing that he cared about the whole state, and not just about himself. The Athenians fined him for the losses they suffered in the first two years of the war, “And then, not much later, as a multitude is apt to behave (ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὅμιλος ποιεῖν), they elected him general and entrusted all their affairs to him, since … they considered him the most valuable man for the needs of the whole city (πλείστου ἄξιον). For as long as he presided over the city in peacetime he led it with moderation (μετρίως) and preserved it in safety (ἀσφαλῶς) and it became greatest in his hands He lived two years and six months longer, and after he died his foresight regarding the war was even more widely recognized… ” He told them not to extend the empire, and to preserve their fleet, but the leaders after him “managed all these affairs in the opposite way, and in accordance with personal ambition and personal gain (φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κερδή) they pursued other policies that seemed unrelated to the war, the the detriment of both themselves and tha allies, since, when these succeeded they brought honor and benefit more to individuals but, when they failed, they did damage to the city… The reason was that he, influential through both reputation (ἀξίωμα) and judgment (γνώμη) and notable for being most resistant to bribery (χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος) , exercised free control over the people and was not led by them instead of leading them, because he did not speak to please in order to acquire power by improper means, but, since he had this through his prestige, even contradicted them in their anger… And what was in name a democracy became in actuality rule by the first man.”
“Those who came later, in contrast, since they were more on an equal level with one another and each was striving to become first, even resorted to handing over affairs to the people’s pleasure (ἡδονάς). As a rεsult, many mistakes were made, since a great city ruling an empire was involved, especially the expedition to Sicily, which was a mistake not so much of judgment about those they wer attacking as because the senders did not subseauently make decisions advantageous for the participants, but by engaging in personal attacks over the leading postion among the common people they both reduced the vigor of the armed forces and for the fist time fell into confusion in the administration of the city. And after they had failed in Sicily, not ony with their other forces, but also with the larger part of the fleet, and now had a revolutionary situation in the city” (literally, “being in stasis”)… (2. 65).
B. Brasidas. A Formidable Opponent, and a Contrast to Kleon.
When the Athenians were attacking Methone, Brasidas, with a small force of Spartan hoplites, “forced his way into Methone, and although he lost a few of his men in the onslaught, he not only secured the city but, as a result of this act of daring, was the first in this war to be commended at Sparta” (2. 25).
In book 4 (11-12), Thucydides speaks admiringly about Brasidas’ decisive leadership and bravery in the attack on the Athenians at Koryphasion (Pylos), where he urged them to crash their ships to attack the Athenians holding that part of the Peloponnese, and he led the attack himself, and was seriously wounded. Thucydides says that it was his shield that the Athenians set up as a trophy after the battle (4.12).
Later in book 4, Thucydides speaks admiringly about Brasidas’ quick action, brilliant tactics, and bravery in battle. He takes the northern city of Torone, and then showed his piety to Athena in the town of Lekythos by donating thirty silver minai to her temple (4.116).
Thucydides points out how Brasidas’ brilliant tactics saved his army from the Illyrians (4. 128).
In book 5, Thucydides contrasts the leadership of Kleon and Brasidas. Kleon’s men were bothered by Kleon’s “incompetence and cowardice” in contrast to Brasidas’ “expertise and daring” (5.7).
Thucydides mentions the clever tactics that Brasidas uses at Amphipolis (τέχνῃ 5.8), and puts a noble speech in his mouth before the battle (5.9). He gives Kleon no speech, and in contrast to Brasidas’ death while making an attack, he says that Kleon was killed while he running away (5.10). Brasidas’ men carried him to Amphipolis, where he stayed alive long enough to hear that his army had defeated the Athenians, and his men then set up a trophy.
After both of these leaders die, Thucydides details how the people of Amphipolis gave Brasidas a public burial in a prominent place at their Agora, worshipped him as a hero with annual games an sacrifices, and replaced the original founder of their city with Brasidas, so much did they respect him. They called him their savior (σωτῆρα 5.11). Thucydides gives no information about what happened to Kleon’s body or his funeral.
III. Complication: How to be a Leader in a City (Athens) Where the Assembly is Supreme, and Often Capricious? The Cases of Alcibiades, Kleon, and Nikias
A. Alcibiades as Leader, and the Ruin of Athenian Democracy.
Thucydides sees Alcibiades’ leadership and private life as something that caused the Athenians to lose the war.
His way of life was wasteful and self indulgent:
“He indulged himself in expenditures beyond his actual resources, both for horse-breeding and for other luxuries; and to a great extent it was this which destroyed the Athenian city. The masses, frightened by the magnitude of his license in conducting his personal life and of his aims in absolutely everything he did, whatever it was, developed hostility toward him as an aspiring tyrant, and while he as a public person managed the war with the utmost skill, they as private individuals detested him for his behavior, and by entrusting the city to others they ruined it in short order” (6.15). In other words, the citizens hated him personally, and let that hatred overpower their recognition that he was a great general. His leadership was tainted by his personal life, and by the citizens’ distaste for it, which resulted in their making bad decisions – like electing him to lead the Sicilian Expedition, and then recalling him to stand trial for the desecration of the Herms. It is difficult to be a leader in this kind of radical democracy.
B. Kleon the Demagogue.
Thucydides shows that Kleon is a demagogue; someone who knows how to fire up the crowd’s emotions. He is a most persuasive speaker, as Thucydides says, and had “had won over the previous assembly to the death sentence” for all adult males at Mytilene, playing on the crowd’s passions. But when they have second thoughts, he condemns them for changing their mind and going soft (3.37). If not for Diodotus’ calm and rational speech, Kleon’s motion might have stood. Kleon only lost by a very few votes. The crowd came that close to a more widespread slaughter, but on Kleon’s later motion, they did vote to kill over a thousand Mytileneans whom Paches had brought from Lesbos (3.50).
When in the assembly Nikias offers Kleon the command at Pylos, he was terrified, and tried to backpedal. Thucydudes says, “As a crowd is apt to do, the more Kleon continued to shun the expedition and take back shat he had said, the more the Athians exhorted Nikias to give up his command and shouted at Kleon to sail (4. 28). Seeing the people all worked up, Kleon becomes a braggart, and says that he did not fear the Lacedaemonians, and promised to come back from Pylos successful in 20 days.
C. Nikias: Well-Meaning but Ineffective. Fearful of Democracy, and its Victim.
Nikias, of whom Thucydides had a good opinion, was not successful in trying to persuade the Assembly not to undertake the Sicilian Expedition (6.9-14). And when he saw that the crowd was persuaded by the rash promises of Alcibiades, who, says Thucydides “most passionately” (προθυμότατα) urged the expedition (6.15), and that the crowd wanted to send an army to Sicily, Nikias tried a rhetorical strategy that failed: He told the people that the expedition would require a huge amount of manpower and ships, hoping to deter them with reason, but the crowd showed a “passion for the expedition” (ἔρως ἐκπλεῦσαι, 6.24).
The democracy sends Nikias as a general to Sicily, although he was against the expedition, and when the expedition begins to fail, Nikias is more afraid of the Athenian assembly than he is of the enemy in Sicily, and Thucydides seems to be sympathetic with him on that fear, and in general.
When the Athenian situation is dire, and their army in danger of failing through losses, disease, and exhaustion, Nikias’ fellow general Demosthenes reasonably argues that they should leave Sicily with the ships that they still had left (7.47). Nikias had some information that some Syracusans might betray the town to the Athenians, but he voiced a concern that is very telling about the volatile and fickle Athenian democracy: he was more afraid of being killed by the passionate Athenian Assembly than by the current enemy: “He know very well that the Athenians would find this action on their part unacceptable, that they had left without their vote; and those voting over their fate would not be men who would judge the situation by seeing it firsthand, like themselves, rather than hearing about it in castigations by others, but who instead, whatever slanders any fine speaker might bring forward, would be persuaded accordingly. And many of those who were present as soldiers, in fact, he said, the majority who were now raising the cry that they were in an awful plight would raise the opposite cry when they got home, that the generals left because they turned traitor for money. Therefore, he at least, knowing the Athenian character, had no wish to die unjustly, on a shameful charge, at the hands of the Athenians, rather than taking his chances as an individual and meeting his end, if he must, at the hands of the enemy” (7.48).
Thucydides does not idealize Nikias, however. When there is an eclipse of the moon (7.50), and Nikias makes the fatal mistake of delaying departure from Syracuse for 27 days, because he “was indeed somewhat over-credulous about divination and everything of the sort” (ἦν γὰρ τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῷ τε καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσκείμενος 7.50).
When the Syracusans murder Nikias after his surrender, Thucydides remarks, “of all the Hellenes, at least in my time, certainly the least deserving to reach this level of misfortune because of a way of life directed entirely toward virtue” (διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν 7.86).
Thucydides seems to be saying that the democracy’s passion is its problem. It is the “Passion” of the crowd that only a strong leader like Pericles can control.
D. The Passions of Athenian Democracy. And its Resilience.
Look at what Thucydides says about the Athenian emotional and passionate reaction to the news that their entire fleet and army were list in Sicily: “And at Athens, when the news arrived, for a long time they would not believe, even from those who were very much soldiers surviving the action itself and reporting it plainly, that everything in its entirety could have been so entirely destroyed; and when they realized, they were angry at the orators who had shared their zeal for the expedition, just as though they had not voted for it themselves, and furious at the oracle-mongers, seers, and anyone whose divinations had made them hope that they would capture Sicily. Everyone grieved them on every side, and after what had occurred, terror and the most extreme consternation came over them…” (8.1). And finally they resolve to appoint a board of overseers, rebuild the fleet, and put the city in order. It seems that they had learned their lesson and had sobered up, and Thucydides comments on this as one of the strengths of a democracy: “And they were prepared to be orderly in every respect in accordance with their immediate alarm, just as a democracy is apt to behave” (ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν 8.1).
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