Thucydides Book 1. Daniel Levine Notes March 24, 2021.
Outline of Book 1.
- “Archaeology” to show that ancient wars were not as big as the Peloponnesian War. (1- 19).
- “Methodology” to show that his history was the most accurate (20-23).
- “Epidamnos and Potideia Affairs” to show how Athenians made alliance with Corcyra, and besieged Potideia, thus fighting against the Corinthians, who speak against them to the Spartans (24-86), who vote to go to war with Athens.
- “Pentacontaetia” to show the rise of Athenian power after the Persian Wars (89-118).
- Second meeting at Sparta, Corinthian Speech for war (119-124).
- “Drive out the Curses” of Kylon (aimed at Pericles and Athens), and of Tainaron (aimed at Pausanias and Spartans) (126-128).
- Pausanias and Themistocles both Medize (128-138)
- Spartan Ultimatum, Pericles’ Speech for War, Pre-War Activities (139-146)
In the first part of his Peloponnesian War, Thucydides makes several points that we should keep in mind as we look at his work, because he will demonstrate these repeatedly in his work.
1) His own feeling of omniscience. He feels that he has a clear vision of the events, and represents them more accurately than anyone else could.
1.1. He began writing at the beginning, “in expectation that it would be a major [war] and notable beyond all previous wars…”
1.20-22. Thucydides considers himself to be an accurate, scientific historian, better than those like Herodotus, or the exaggerations of poets. 1) He wants to correct the foolish ideas of people, who do not take an effort to do research, but only “turn toward what is readily available,” and that he uses “the clearest possible evidence.” His use of speeches contains “the closest possible fidelity to the overall sense of what was actually said.” He examined accounts he learned from others and recorded “with the utmost possible accuracy.” He specifically says that he avoids “patriotic storytelling”, and that his history is not to be a popular work for his contemporaries, but “It is a possession for all time, not a competition piece to be heard for the moment.”
1.23 Thucydides knows the “truest cause” of the war, “the one least openly expressed.” But because of his insight, he tells what it is: Increase of Athenian power, and the fear it inspired among Lacedaemonians and their allies.
2) His belief that the topic of his history – “the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians” – “was certainly the greatest disturbance to affect the Hellenes and a considerable number of barbarians – one might say the majority of mankind.”
To support this, he gives an account of ancient Greece before and after the Trojan War, to show that cities in those times were not strong enough to have a long, large-scale war like that which he records, which was twice as long as the Trojan War. In doing so, he also compares the Lelantine War between Eretria and Chalkis, and the sea empire of Minos. Even the Persian War was of lesser magnitude: “it had a quick resolution in two battles on sea and two on land” (1.23).
1.50: The battle between the Athenian-Corcyrean fleet and that of the Corinthians (433 BCE, Sybota): “For in the number of ships the sea battle was larger than any previously fought between Hellenes.”
3) His belief that “faction” (στάσις stasis) is a major negative factor in the life of the city states of Greece.
1.2.3 In ancient times, the parts of Hellas with the best soil created situations where factional strife arouse, “that ruined the people living there (στάσεις ἐξ ὧν ἐφθείροντο staseis ex hon ephtheironto).” But Attica, because of its poor soil, was “without faction (ἀστασίαστον astasiaston).”
1.12: After the Trojan War, there was widespread turmoil in Hellas, along with faction (στἀσεις staseis), which created a refugee migration.
1.18: Sparta went through “the longest known period of faction (στασιάσασα stasiasasa)after its conquest by the Dorians,” but later became well ordered by laws (ηὐνομήθη eunomethe).
4) His belief that one of the major forces in history is the (innate?) desire for one group to exercise its power over another for its own advantage, regardless of justice.
The Corinthians support the popular party from Epidamnus, even though they are not a democratic city state themselves, out of a desire to diminish the power of the Corcyreans, who were supporting the aristocrats.
1.44-45 The Athenian democracy, because they want the alliance of the powerful Corcyrean navy, decide to help the aristocratic party against the democrats of Epidamnus. The Athenians accepted the alliance with Corcyra because 1) They wanted Corcyra and Corinth to wear one another down, because they saw that war was inevitable; 2) “the island’s favorable location on the coastal route to Italy and Sicily.”
1.75-76: The strong naturally must dominate the weak, and one’s own self-interest is stronger than considerations of justice. This is reflected in the speech of an Athenian at the Spartan assembly. He argues that 1) because Athens had a leading role in the Persian Wars that it has a right to hold their empire without the other Hellenes resenting it, and 2) “ We have done nothing remarkable, nor contrary to ordinary human behavior, if we not only accepted an empire when it was offered but also did not let it go…since the rule has always existed that the weaker is held down by the stronger.” He goes on to say 3) That the Spartans are only pretending to use arguments of ‘justice’ to attack the Athenians, when really their main concern is their own interests (1.76). The justice argument “never yet … deterred anyone who propounded it from taking advantage, when there was an opportunity to gain something by might.” In other words, people are more swayed by their own self interest and desire for power than they are by considerations of what is morally right.
Thucydides’ conclusion about why Spartans voted for war, “not so much because they were persuaded by the arguments of their allies (i.e. for reasons of right and wrong), as because they feared further interest in the power of the Athenians, seeing the greater part of Hellas already under their control” (1. 88).
5) His belief that the rise of sea power was a decisive factor in power struggles.
1.4: The importance of Minos’ navy for his rule of Cyclades and conquest of the Karians.
1.4: The importance of sea power for pirate raids, and (1.7) the building of cities away from the sea to avoid pirate incursions.
1.13: When Greece became stronger after the Trojan War, tyrants arose, established navies, “and were more active at sea”; the Corinthians first developed the trireme (warship), and the earliest major sea battle was between the Corinthians and the Corcyreans.
1.14: Themistocles convinced the Athenians to build a navy, which helped them both against their neighbors on the island of Aegina, and also in the Persian War.
1.15: Those Greeks who developed navies “consolidated the greatest gains in both revenues and rule over others; especially if teir land was insufficient, they sailed to the islands and subjugated them.”
1.142: In Pericles’ speech in favor of war against the Lacedaemonians, he says, “If they build a small fort, they might harm the country somewhat by raids and by harboring runaways, yet it will certainly not be enough to keep us from sailing to their territory and building forts and retaliating with our navy, our real strength. For we have a greater advantage as to land warfare from our experience in seafaring than they have from their experience on land where naval matters are concerned. And becoming skilled at sea will not be an easy acquisition for them… Seamanship is a skill just like anything else, and there is no way to cultivate it as an outside activity when chance offers, but rather there can be no activities outside that..”
1.143: Pericles continues to brag on Athenian superiority at sea, “This is in fact the case, and as our strongest asset of all we have citizens for pilots and other rowing specialists whose numbers and quality are superior to those of the rest of Hellas combined.”
Pericles continues bragging about Athenian sea power: “That is the greatness of sea power, and consider: if we were islanders, who would be more unassailable? As it is, thinking like them as nearly as possible, we must let go of the land and its houses, and stand guard over the sea and the city…, If I thought I would persuade you, I would have told you to go out and lay waste your property ourselves and show the Peloponnesians that you would certainly not submit on that account.”
[This echoes what Themistocles was supposed to have said to the Athenians years earlier, according to Thucydides (1.93) “He also considered the Peiraeus more valuable than the city above it and many times advised the Athenians, if they were ever truly hard pressed, to come down and use their ships to stand off the whole world.”
Thucydides puts in a Corinthian’s mouth the contrast between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, as he encourages the Spartans and their allies to war against the Athenians(1.70-1). He does not use the word polypragmosyne, but it sums up what he thinks of the Athenians.
Athenians Spartans
Innovative, Fast Acting Preserve status quo; hesitate to act.
Bold, Risk Taking, Confident Minimal action; uncertainty.
Ready to act Delayers.
Go abroad Home-Bound.
Value Innovation Obsolete ways (1.71)
Fast Slow (1.71)
1.70: “And so, if someone were to sum them up by saying that they were born to have no peace themselves and allow it to no one else, he would be right.”The word ΠΟΛΥΠΡΑΓΜΟΣΥΝΗ does not appear in this text, but it defines what the text implies: the state of hyperactivity.
1.87 Spartan Voting Method, by ephor Sthenelaidas: Acclamation, and physical movement to determine exact numbers.
Pentacontaetia: interruption of narrative for two reasons: 1) No adequate account existed, 2) it shows how the Athenian Empire was established (1. 97).
1.90-93. Building of Long Walls after Persian sack, and clever ruse of Themistocles.
Pausanias’ violence and tyrannical exercise of power, and his medism made him hateful to the Greeks.
The Athenians became hateful to the Greeks by their own violence in treatment of their subject city-states.
1.102. Spartans insult Athenians by sending them home after inviting them to help in the siege of Mt. Ithome against the Messenians, because the Spartans feared Athenian new ideas, like democracy.
1.103 Beginnings of Corinthian hatred of Athens.. Megara came over to Athens, because of Corinthians on their border causing problems.
1.108 Spartans win a battle in Boiotia, then Athenians enter Boiotia, and occupy it.
1.109 Athenian disaster in Egypt… 454 BCE.
1.113 Boeotians kick out Athenians 446 BCE. Euboea Revolts.
1.115: 446 BCE. 30-year treaty between Athens and Sparta. Lasted 15 years (to 431).
- 116-117: 440 BCE Samos revolt. Pericles and Athenian fleet put down revolt, and at Byzantium, too.
NOTE: Both heroes of the Persian War (Pausanias the Spartan and Themistocles the Athenian) eventually Medized (cooperated with the Persians).
Pausanias, the Spartan leader in the Battle of Plataia, sent letter to Persian king (1.128-129), proposing to marry Xerxes’ daughter and help Xerxes take over Greece. He even started dressing up like a Persian. He even put his own name on the tripod at Delphi, which commemorated the victory over the Persians at Plataia (1. 132). He revealed his conspiracy to the ephors in the two-part hut at Tainaron, and died outside the bronze house, where the Spartans later dedicated two statues.
Themistocles, the Athenian leader at Salamis, was ostracized and living in Argos, fled the Spartans, who accused him of collaborating in Pausanias’ medism. He flees to Molossia (Epirus), then to Pydna in Macedonia, and took a ship to Ionia, eventually ending up in Ephesus (1.137), sent a letter to Xerxes, claiming to have been the one to help Xerxes get back safely over the Hellespont bridge, and saying he wanted to be his friend. He spent a year learning Persian language and customs, and became a valued member of Xerxes’ court in Persia. Thucydides praises his intelligence, and tells how his bones were brought back from Asia for burial in Attica.
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