Thucydides 4 and 5. Levine Notes. 31 March 2021
Trophy. Classics in Our World.
Thucydides: 4.12: Brasidas’ [?] shield which he lost at Pylos became part of the Athenian trophy celebrating their victory there in 425. ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΙ ΑΠΟ ΛΑΚΕΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΩΝ ΕΚ ΠΥΛΟ. “And when he fell into the outrigger his shield slipped off into the sea, and after it was cast up on land the Athenians picked it up and later used it for the trophy they set up over this engagement.”
When the Athenians had captured the Spartans on the island of Sphacteria, they set up a trophy on the island. [4.38] See other trophy setups at 4.44 (Corinth, Athens); 4.25 (Sicily, Athens); 5.3 (Torone, Athens); 5.10 (Amphipolis, Sparta)
Historical Document: First 421 treaty, an inscription of which quoted in Thucydides 5.18 was to be set up on a pillar (στήλας στῆσαι) at Olympia, Pytho, and Istmus, at Athens on the Acropolis and in Lacedaemon at Amyklai. The treaty between Athens and Sparta (5.23) was to be set up on an inscribed pillar (στήλην στῆσαι), “in Lacedaemon by the Apollo statue at Amyklai, in Athens on the Acropolis by the Athena statue.”
Greek Inscription of a Treaty
Greedy (and Brutal) Athenian Democracy.
Thucydides’ belief: The Athenians are at fault for always wanting more.
This is a theme in the History, and accounts for the disaster at Sicily, too.
[4.21] When Athenians had the Spartans trapped on Sphacteria, and the Lacedaemonians asked for a peace treaty in exchange for the men, “the Athenians considered that, since they held the men on the island, the truce was now available at any time they wanted to arrange it with the Lacedaemonians, and they grasped at more (πλέονος ὠρέγοντο.). In particular, Kleon, son of Kleainetos urged them on…”
[4.41] When the Athenians had actually gotten control of the men, the Spartans again sent to Athens to make a treaty to get their men back, “But the Athenians were intent on larger gains and sent them away unsuccessful as often as they came” (οἱ δὲ μειζόνων τε ὠρέγοντο καὶ πολλάκις φοιτώντων αὐτοὺς ἀπράκτους ἀπέπεμπον)
We can also see the Athenian determination to take Melos in Book 5 (5.86-116) as part of this fault of the Athenians. The Athenian negotiators scoff at the Melians’ hope in the gods and the Spartans, and say that their role as being the superior in strength is to rule over others, and it is like their destiny to add the Melians to their empire. It is the nature of an empire to expand, and Thucydides makes this point by pointing out the brutal conclusion of the dialogue: the death of all the men, and enslavement of the women and children, and the re-populating of the island with Athenians. “According to our understanding, divinity, it would seem, and mankind, as has always been obvious, are under an innate compulsion to rule wherever empowered… we know that you and anyone else who attained power like ours would act accordingly” (5.105).
Sikels.
“Barbarians” involved in inter-polis warfare on Sicily. These are indigenous Sicilians who take part in fighting Messenians, in favor of Athens… (and themselves?) [4.25]
Mythology Explained with Reason.
Charybdis [4.24] “This strait is the water between Rhegion and Sicily where Sicily is the shortest distance from the mainland, also the place called Charybdis where Odysseus is said to have sailed through. Because of its narrowness, and with strong currents from the two great seas, the Tyrrhenian and the Sicilian, rushing in, it is understandably known as dangerous.”
Thucydides’ comments on the Athenian Kleon, son of Kleainetos (d. 422 BCE). Does he like Kleon?
Thucydides Calls Kleon “Most Violent of the Citizens.”
“The very man who had won over the previous assembly to the death sentence, and who was in general the most violent of the citizens, and by far the most persuasive among the people at that time…” ὢν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ τε δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος, Thucydides 3.36.2
Thucydides Calls Kleon “Demagogue.”
“… being a popular leader (literally, ‘a demagogue’) at that time and most influential with the people…” ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος. Thucydides 4.21
Kleon Treats Reports as “Fake News,” Since They Make Him Look Bad.
When their men guarding Sphacteria were in difficulty, the Athenians regretted not having accepted the truce that the Spartans when it was first offered. Kleon realized that their misgivings “were directed towards himself,” and denounced the reports of their men’s hardships as lies: (οὐ τἀληθη ἔφη λέγειν τοὺς ἐξαγγέλλοντας (literally, “he said that the ones making the reports were not telling the truth.”) Thucydides 4.27
Thucydides Says that Reasonable Athenians Wanted to Get Rid of Kleon.
When Kleon brags that he will take command and bring in or kill the Spartans on Sphacteria within 20 days, some Athenians laughed, but “the more prudent among them (τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων) calculated with satisfaction that they would have one of one of two benefits: either they would get rid of Kelon, which they considered more likely (ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπιζον, or, ‘which they hoped for more’), or, if their judgment was wrong, he would make the Lacedaemonians their prisoners.” Thucydides 4.28
Kleon Denounces Athenian Military Leaders.
Kleon denounced the military leaders, and put “personal hostility into the criticism (ἐχθρὸς ὣν καὶ ἐπιτιμῶν literally ‘being his personal enemy and blaming him),” implying that their manhood was deficient: “If the generals were men (εἰ ἄνδρες εἶεν οἱ στρατηγοί),” it would be easy to capture the Spartans. and said that he could capture the Spartans at Pylos. Thucydides 4.27
Thucydides Contrasts the Expertise and Daring of Brasidas with Kleon’s Incompetence and Cowardice. Thucydides says that Kleon had no sense, but that he thought that he did.
“Kleon stayed inactive for a while and then was forced to act exactly as Brasidas anticipated. Since the soldiers were not only irritated by the inactivity but airing their feelings about his leadership and the degree of incompetence and cowardice [ἀνεπιστημοσύνη καὶ μαλακία] he was matching against a like degree of expertise and daring [of Brasidas], also about their reluctance to follow him from the very start, Kleon, aware of the murmurs and not wanting the men to be demoralized by staying in the same place, roused them and set out. He assumed the same attitude whose success regarding Pylos assured him that he had some sort of ability…” [Rex Warner translates, “where his success ηad convinced him of his intelligence.” καὶ ἐς τὴν Πύλον εὐτυχήσας ἐπίστευσέ τι φρονεῖν] Thuicydides 5.7.
Cowardly Death of Kleon.
Thucydides implies he died in a cowardly manner: “Kleon, since he had not intended to stand his ground in the first place, immediately fled (εὐθὺς φεύγων)and was run down and killed by a Myrkinian peltast…” and subsequently “the whole Athenian army was now in a disastrous flight” (οὕτω δὴ τὸ στράτευμα πᾶν ἤδη τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυγὸν χαλεπῶς). Thucydides 5.10.
Thucydides’ Harsh Assessment of Kleon’s Motivations.
“After the Athenian defeat at Amphipolis and the deaths of Kleon and Brasidas, — certainly the main opponents of peace on either side – one of them [Brasidas] because of the success and honor derived from the war, the other [Kleon] because he thought that in calmer times he would be recognized as a rogue (literally ‘doing bad things’), and his slanders would lack credibility.” Thucydides 5.16 γενομένης ἡσυχίας καταφανέστερος νομίζων ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων
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